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Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Concurrent Sourcing
in Water Public Services
Simon Porcher
Abstract
Analytical frameworks of government service contracting decisions typically fo-
cuses on the make-or-buy decision. In concepts, governments can either produce
the service itself (make), or outsource production (buy). However, governments
make and buy the same public services, a practice that is termed concurrent sourc-
ing. Drawing on transaction cost economics and the resource-based view of the
firm, this paper examines empirically local governments’ propensities to concur-
rently source public services. Using a unique dataset on water public services of
more than 4,000 French municipalities for four years - 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008 -
we find that low transaction hazards, prior contracting experience and low produc-
tion capabilities have a positive impact on the level of concurrent sourcing. These
findings demonstrate that organizations’ characteristics are a significant factor in
sourcing decisions and suggest that capabilities and their interactions with transac-
tion hazards deserve heightened attention in the study of public contracting.
Keywords: water trading contracts, transaction costs, capabilities, concurrent
sourcing, contracting.
Introduction
Government contracting for the delivery of public services has been a growing prac-
tice in the last decades (Greene [1996], Kettl [1993], Levin and Tadelis [2010], Savas
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[2000] and Sclar [2000]). Analyses of government contracting decisions typically
focus on corner solutions: governments can either directly produce the public ser-
vice (make), or outsource the production of the public service (buy). In practice,
governments both make and buy the same public service, a strategy that is often
termed concurrent sourcing. Concurrent sourcing refers to splitting the total volume
being sourced across multiple modes. It is different from hybrid governance forms
(Williamson [1991]), which refer to sourcing the entire volume of the good from a
single governance mode.
Myriad of approaches have been used to study why organizations simultaneously
make and buy the same input1, a phenomenon referred in the literature to variously
as partial (Porter [1980]) or tapered integration (Azoulay [2004]), plural (Gulati
et al. [2012]), dual (Adelman [1949]), or concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani [2007])
for example. Scholars in public administration, who primarily conceptualized the
outsourcing decision as a dichotomous choice (Bel and Fageda [2009]) or a set of
choices between direct management, private firms or intergovernmental contract-
ing (Hefetz and Warner [2012]), have also adopted the view of concurrent sourcing
to explain the mixed delivery strategy of local governments (Miranda and Lerner
[1995], Hefetz et al. [2014]).
This article uses a dataset of more than 4,500 French water public services ob-
served between 1998 and 2008 to explain the determinants of concurrent sourcing
and shed light on its impact on performance. In France, as in most industrialized
countries, municipalities are responsible for distribution, treatment and storage, and
seeking additional water supplies when necessary. The production and distribution
of water can be directly managed by the municipality or delegated to a private firm
via lease contracts for example (“delegated management contracts”). Whatever the
choice made by municipalities to organize the public service, they can sign contracts
with other municipalities to trade water (“water trading contracts”). The present
1The typical example is the classical work by Monteverde and Teece [1982] in which the authors define
“make” as when the firm produces 80 percent or more of its requirements and “buy” as when the firm
produces less than this amount.
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paper focuses on the latter. While it is probably less frequent in other countries,
66% of the municipalities in our dataset use water trading contracts. The setup of
the game is the following. Assume that there are only two municipalities, municipal-
ity X, under direct management, and municipality Y, under delegated management.
Both municipalities own water public services that are producing and distributing
water to the final users. Municipality X can sign a water trading contract to buy,
let us say 10% of its annual billed water, from municipality Y which solely uses
internal production. This contract does not change the organization of the public
service for both municipalities, municipality Y would just have to add an amend-
ment to the lease contract with the private firm. In our terminology, municipality
X concurrently sources water (or outsources 10% of its production to municipality
Y) while municipality Y produces internally.
Why do then municipalities concurrently source water? At its core, the analysis
of concurrent sourcing is not different from the make-or-buy decision; such prob-
lem which has been studied for a whole set of public services (Hefetz and Warner
[2012], Levin and Tadelis [2010] and Savas [2000] for example). Consistent with
transaction costs economics (TCE; Coase [1937], Williamson [1975]), we find that
the governance structure of a given transaction is a function of the relative costs of
transacting in markets and organizing procurement within the municipality (Brown
and Potoski [2003b], Hefetz and Warner [2012], Sclar [2000]). Municipalities expe-
riencing low transaction costs will then rely on concurrent sourcing more intensely
than municipalities facing high transaction costs. Following the resource-based view
(RBV) of the firm (Barney [1991], Penrose [1959] and Wernerfelt [1984]), another
contributing factor is that municipalities’ attributes can affect the level of concurrent
sourcing. Our results show that municipalities with high production capabilities and
high cost-efficiency tend to rely on internal production. Scholars in public adminis-
tration have also referred directly or indirectly to the RBV to explain contracting
performance (Brown and Potoski [2003a,b,c, 2004, 2006], Kelman [2002], Romzek
and Johnston [2002] and Yang et al. [2009]). As Brown and Potoski [2003a] state,
“contract-management capacity may be important - if not necessary - for successful
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contract arrangements”. Our findings suggest that municipalities that can draw on
superior contracting capabilities tend to rely on concurrent sourcing. We finally
interact TCE and the RBV (Fabrizio [2012], Hefetz and Warner [2012] and Hefetz
et al. [2015]) to assess how interactions between TCE and the RBV can mitigate or
increase the level of concurrent sourcing. We find that capabilities have a declining
effect when transaction costs are high. These findings suggest evidence that concur-
rent sourcing is used to mitigate price increases, to increase quality and to ensure
service continuity for users.
We then analyze the impact of concurrent sourcing on performance, which com-
plements previous studies on concurrent sourcing. Miranda and Lerner [1995], using
data from a large sample of cities in the US, find that mix private or nonprofit sector
production with some internal government production are generally cost effective.
Arrangements mixing public and private procurement can improve the delivery of
public services. Hefetz and Warner [2008] undertake a similar study and show that
public managers integrate markets with public delivery in order to balance concerns
with efficiency, market management, and citizen satisfaction. Our results show that
concurrent sourcing has a significant positive impact on quality performance but
results in price premiums, potentially because external procurement demands ca-
pabilities to negotiate contracts and to mitigate ex post hazards. Such a result is
connected to Hefetz et al. [2014] who show that concurrent sourcing in public ser-
vices is more frequent when local governments want to reduce risks.
This paper is of interest for scholars in public administration and policy for at
least two reasons. First, the French institutional context and the quality of our
data makes such a study very interesting. Contracts between municipalities are
interesting to study because they represent, to a certain extent, situations in which
a municipality ensures the production of a public service for another municipality,
even though the elected municipal council remains responsible for the provision of
the public service. Second, water supply is often considered a complex public ser-
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vice2 and lessons learned from water issues are generalizable to a certain extent
to other public services. Water trades between municipalities can be an impor-
tant means to ensure service continuity, especially in countries experiencing water
scarcity such as Spain or the United States. The recent case of Flint3 in the United
States shows the importance of water trading between municipalities. While the fo-
cus of the paper is on water trades for drinking water only, the results of the paper
are of interests for researchers and professionals working on large water resources
transfers. In California, Emerick and Lueck [2014] show that there is a huge market
for water reallocations via contracted agreement. For example, the Imperial Irriga-
tion District and San Diego County Water Authority have an agreement involving
transferring water from the former to the latter. Water scarcity and the need to
transfer resources are also prevalent in developing countries where scarcity can im-
pact social stability. The results of our study can thus be of interest for researchers
and professionals working on water trading as a whole and more generally inter-
government contracting. Overall, this piece of research adds to our understanding
of local governments’ sourcing decisions to transactions’ conditions and to their own
capabilities. Our results offer evidence that sourcing decisions result from the na-
ture of the transaction and contract management capabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
theory and hypotheses while the section after introduces the institutional context.
An empirical section follows that describes the dataset and the methodology. The
results segment present the findings and how these relate to the hypotheses. A final
section discusses the results. A brief conclusion follows.
2For example Brown and Potoski [2005] ask public managers to assess the transaction cost properties of
64 local government services. Public managers consider water distribution and treatment highly specific
with respective scores of 3.94 and 4.12 out of 5. Hefetz and Warner [2012] use a similar survey and finds
that contracts in water distribution and treatment are among the most difficult to manage (only electric
and gas utilities are more difficult to manage).
3Since April 2014, the city of Flint has experienced a drinking water contamination crisis after the
change in source from treated Lake Huron water via Detroit to the Flint River. The city used to buy
water from Detroit since the 1960s. In 2013, the Flint city council decided to switch from Detroit water
to its own internal production.
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Theory and Hypotheses
Transaction Costs and Concurrent Sourcing
TCE has been established as a dominant lens to view firm boundary decisions. In
this theory, the firm considers the ex ante and ex post costs as the primary de-
terminer of whether to conduct an activity internally or externally, as these are
distinct governance structures. Even if scale economies can be influential in the de-
cision to make rather than buy, TCE stresses that production costs are not sufficient
to understand the make-or-buy decision. Because of opportunism and bounded ra-
tionality, the key question with respect to the make-or-buy decision is determining
when the transaction costs of using the market are larger than those of internal
organization. For any transaction, a firm purchases from external suppliers when
the cost of the input in the market, added to the transaction costs, is less than the
cost of internal production. In the parlance of TCE, transaction costs associated
with managing water supply are elevated because contract terms must account for
transaction hazards such as service discontinuity (see Brown and Potoski [2003a]
for an assessment of transaction costs in different public services) and because there
is a chance of substantial risk of incurring costs through maladaptation, i.e. the
failure to adapt. Uncertainties about the evolution of water consumption and the
inability to foresee the various kinds of contracting hazards such as increased prices
or decreased water quality due to bounded rationality4 are important shifters of
transaction costs in water trading markets.
According to Williamson [1996], asset specificity is the main driver of transaction
costs. Asset specificity means that an asset’s value is reduced substantially if a com-
plementary asset which is contracted for is unable to be secured. The general result
from the literature is that hierarchy is likely to dominate temporary contracting
when either of two agents in a relationship makes relationship-specific investments
(Klein et al. [1978] and Williamson [1979]). If a buyer makes investments in assets
which are dedicated to a relationship with a particular seller, an interconnection
4It is for example difficult to verify on a daily basis the quality of water bought to the other municipality
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between water networks for example, then there is scope for opportunistic behavior
in short-term contracts. By the same token, it would be costly and difficult for the
buyer to replace the supplier if the contract were to be suddenly terminated. Water
public services exemplify these issues as service continuity and consumers’ depen-
dency affect asset specificity, bounded rationality, opportunism and thus transaction
costs. When transaction costs are high, municipalities will increase the percentage
of their own production to the point of internal provision.
A common assumption in public procurement (see Brown and Potoski [2003b]
Levin and Tadelis [2010] and Hefetz and Warner [2012]) is that complexity in pro-
viding the service is assumed to be linked with contracts harder to write, monitor
or adjust. Indeed, contracts that must agree on detailed plans of action to safe-
guard hold-up problems are more “relational” in a hierarchy (Williamson [1975]).
Under hierarchy, there is small room for decision rights and adaptations are more
flexible. Regulators or monitors that face complexity in producing their own inputs
can decide to “buy” rather than “make” because uncertainty makes the production
process more complex. When producing the good is costly, transaction costs to use
the market become relatively lower than producing directly, i.e. buying is relatively
less expensive that making. We thus expect the complexity of integrated production
to have a positive impact on concurrent sourcing.
Hypothesis 1. The greater a municipality’s level of complexity in producing directly
the good, the larger the level of concurrent sourcing.
Capabilities and Concurrent Sourcing
The RBV suggests that organizations with different capabilities and resources have
different production costs. Because capabilities are costly to develop and difficult to
price and transfer, local governments would tend to directly perform the activities
that they are good at. In this sense, the RBV complements TCE: local govern-
ments with capabilities to produce at low cost will use hierarchy and supply goods
for other local governments which capabilities do not allow to produce at lower cost.
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A simple reason motivating outsourcing is differences in retail prices between mu-
nicipalities that are located in the same area, i.e. the level of concurrent sourcing
depends on the level of capabilities of local governments relative to those possessed
by local governments around (Demsetz [1988] and Jacobides and Winter [2005]).
As Barney [1991] and Jacobides and Winter [2005] noticed, in a market, firms differ
in their cost-efficiency or product quality. Behind the market lies another firm that
produces a product. In this sense, the market is only an intermediary for buying
and selling products and services. In our case, municipalities that decide to use
contracts to buy and sell water compare their abilities with those of other munici-
palities. Concurrent sourcing is an economizing solution occurring when there are
gains for trade. Local governments differ in their productive capabilities regardless
of scale, and will buy from other suppliers who can carry out the same activity at
lower cost. Differences in production costs among municipalities are incentives to
trade water for economizing reasons.
Hypothesis 2. The greater a municipality’s cost-efficiency, the smaller the level of
concurrent sourcing.
From a dynamic point of view, capabilities can be developed, transfered or ex-
changed on a market Teece et al. [1997]. Municipalities might differ in their abil-
ity to write and administer contracts (see Brown and Potoski [2003a], van Slyke
[2003] Yang et al. [2009]). Familiarity and experience in contracting are lowering
the costs of using contracts for any given service because municipalities might be
able to better anticipate possible future contingencies that affect the contractual
relationship. Municipalities with capabilities to design contracts will be better at
adequately safeguard contractual hazards that can emerge (Mayer and Salomon
[2006]). Williamson [1996] himself explained that TCE “maintains that many eco-
nomic agents have the capacities to learn and to look ahead, perceive hazards, and
factor these back into the contractual relation, thereafter to devise responsive insti-
tutions. In effect, limited but intentional rationality is translated into incomplete
but farsighted contracting.” Another factor influencing the level of conflict among
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contractors is the relation between each transaction and other exchanges, depending
on the actual type of transaction (Coase [1937]). The more homogeneous transac-
tions are, the less expensive internal control of similar transactions and the larger
the likelihood of contracting out is. This argument is linked to the theory of com-
plementarities developed by Milgrom and Roberts [1990]. Complementarities refer
to a situation in which the performance consequences of a choice depend on other
choices. For example, the marginal returns to one activity increase as a firm does
more of the other activities. In the context of public procurement, complementarity
simply refers to the condition in which the marginal benefit of procuring a good
from the market depends on the level of internal production, and vice versa. In
the competitive market, complementarity is divided between incentive complemen-
tarity (Porter [1980]) and knowledge complementarity (Dyer and Singh [1998] for
example). The former is based on competition between internal production and
outsourced production. The idea is that concurrent sourcing gives the municipality
the ability to credibly threaten backward integration to their suppliers. The latter
is based on collaboration between internal and external suppliers in order to create
value for the procuring municipality. As a result, municipalities benefit internal and
external suppliers’ knowledge improvements in production processes and technolo-
gies. A municipality’s experience in doing one thing - i.e. making or buying - can
have a positive impact on the tendency to take complementary contracts.
Hypothesis 3. The greater a municipality’s contracting capabilities, the larger the
level of concurrent sourcing.
Regardless of conflicts among transactors, there are short-term problems affect-
ing contracting decisions, such as a constraints of production capabilities. Munici-
palities with high production capabilities tend to internally source the production
of the good for at least three reasons. The first one is that their production capa-
bilities risk the hold-up problem as concurrent sourcing might give the other party
increased bargaining power resulting in reduced profits for the firm. The second
characteristic is that municipalities with shortages in their production capabilities
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are naturally constrained in their production choices and are thus more likely to con-
currently source than municipalities with abundant production capabilities. Third,
in natural monopoly such as water, fixed costs take on the form of sunk investments,
which make average price decrease and can be interpreted as incentives to produce.
We thus expect production capabilities to have a negative impact on outsourcing
and concurrent sourcing.
Hypothesis 4. The greater a municipality’s production capabilities, the smaller the
level of concurrent sourcing.
Interactions
In cases where transactions are complex and hazards common, a more capable mu-
nicipality will establish routines that facilitate ex post adaptation and improve the
likelihood of mutually agreeable outcomes. Lack of control over the production
process or the buying mechanism can increase or mitigate transaction costs such as
difficulties in monitoring contracts. Municipalities with superior production capa-
bilities are less impacted when transaction costs increase because they can always
revert back to a fully integrated production process. On the contrary, contracting
capabilities are more valuable when transaction costs are relatively low. We ex-
pect a positive change in transaction costs to decrease the impact of capabilities to
contract and increase the impact of capabilities to produce on concurrent sourcing.
Hypothesis 5. Complexity in producing directly the good strengthens the impact of
contracting capabilities on concurrent sourcing.
Hypothesis 6. Complexity in producing directly the good strengthens the impact of
production capabilities on concurrent sourcing.
Institutional Context: Water Supply in France
In France, as in most European countries, municipalities must provide local pub-
lic services that have public good characteristics. Water provision and sewage are
two of these public services and can be managed by two different operators. Wa-
ter provision refers to the production and the distribution of water and sewage
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implies wastewater collection and treatment. The focus of this paper is water provi-
sion. As there is no national regulator, municipalities monitor prices, control entry
and exit of firms into the market, organize competition and ensure uninterrupted
service. However, if the responsibility for public services’ provision is public, its
management can either be public or private. Although some municipalities manage
production through direct public management and undertake all operations and
investments needed for the provision of the service, the dominating organizational
form is private management. Under these delegated management contracts, the
selected operator organizes the public service of water, and thus decides, in part-
nership with the municipality, of the level of water to be concurrently sourced.
Unlike the abovementioned contracts for the organization of the public service,
water trading contracts are usually private-law contracts. These contracts are signed
between two administrative authorities, a municipality or a group of municipalities.5
Under private management, the delegatee will ensure water production and distri-
bution for the municipality but also manage the different contracts signed with other
municipalities to trade water.
There are two cases in which municipalities concurrently source water. The first
set of reasons is linked to price, scale economies and quality. An obvious reason
for buying water is when water production costs more than simply buying it from
neighbor municipalities. This is especially true in the case of small municipalities
located near large water producers. By buying rather than making, municipalities
can benefit from the scale of the economies of the nearby service. Moreover, mu-
nicipalities can buy from neighbor municipalities that have contracted out with the
same operator. It is rather common that private operators spot markets from the
same neighbor in order to produce and trade more water, especially when networks
are already interconnected6. Eventually, municipalities buy water when their raw
5In some rare cases, the contracts are considered by the administrative court as being administrative
contract. The criterion is that water trades have a direct impact on the organization of the public service
of water. Water trades can have a direct impact on the organization of the public service when connecting
investments must be undertaken to deliver water to the buyer.
6The Competition Authority issued a judgment in 2005 about the lack of competition on water trades
when different firms are operating in the same area.
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water is of poor quality. In this case, the municipality can buy raw water or treated
water from another municipality at lower cost than if it had to directly produce
it using its own resource. The second set of reasons is related to water scarcity.
Municipalities that are not able to produce large volumes of water necessarily need
to buy water to other municipalities. Another case of water scarcity is when there
are industries that need large volumes of raw water to function. Large industrial
factories can have a proper pipe connecting them to the water production plant.
While in some cases concurrent sourcing occurs from necessity rather than option,7
in some cases the intensity of concurrent sourcing is deeply influenced by transac-
tion costs and capabilities.
Concurrent sourcing in the water market is interesting to study for several rea-
sons. First, despite differences in raw water quality, concurrent sourcing in the
public water service is made on an equivalent good. Even if water is not pro-
duced exactly with the same technology (treatments and plant quality can differ),
distributed water is a good that is relatively homogeneous in quality and in its in-
herent characteristics. Second, trade frequency is important. Every year, 4 billion
cubic meters of water are billed in France. Even if there are no clear statistics on
global water trades between municipalities in France, the size and the level of the
interconnections of the market increase the probability of concurrent sourcing. In
our dataset, 56% of interconnected municipalities use concurrent sourcing and 66%
of municipalities are involved in water trading. Third, various structural charac-
teristics such as production capabilities make buying and selling capabilities rather
exogenous to TCE and RBV. For these reasons, a significant impact of TCE and
RBV on concurrent sourcing is particularly robust.
7This is analogous to the scissor effect described by Marques [2008].
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Data and Empirical Identification
Datasets and Measures
The unique and fine-grained dataset we use in this study merges three sources. The
data comes from the French Environment Institute (IFEN-SOeS), the French Health
Ministry (DGS) and the French National Institute for Economics and Statistics (IN-
SEE). The unit of observation is a municipality. We observe a set of municipalities
in France during four years: 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008. These municipalities are
withdrawn from a representative set of municipalities. The final dataset is made
of an ubalanced set of 14,884 observations, grouping 4,651 municipalities. Mean
covariates and standard deviation are presented in Table 1 for the whole sample.
The IFEN-SOeS, collected by the French Environment Institute and the En-
vironment Ministry, is a nationally-representative municipal survey of the public
service of water. This sample is representative of the total French population and
the local public authorities from where they are living: all sizes of local authorities
are proportionally represented and municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants
are all represented. The IFEN-SOeS database provides detailed information about
water public services and municipalities’ characteristics. There have been four data
collections in the last ten years. The data collection proceeds as follows. Munici-
palities fill in the database, then the data is checked by the Environment Ministry.
The IFEN-SOeS is the only representative national dataset on water public services.
The database includes a lot of information about water supply at the municipal level
- e.g. billed water in thousands, water sources, treatments and municipalities’ char-
acteristics that can influence water consumption. It also includes some data coming
from the census made by INSEE. This provides information concerning incomes,
regions and information about structural characteristics of the municipalities for
example.
Dependent variable. Concurrent Sourcing is measured as the ratio between water
bought to another municipality and water bought plus water production of a given
13
municipality i at year t. This measure is consistent with prior works (Parmigiani
[2007]). This variable takes values between 0 and 100, 100 meaning that 100% of
the production of water is outsourced. This measure is better than a simple dummy
variable equal to 1 if a municipality concurrently sources because it captures varia-
tions in municipalities’ concurrent sourcing patterns.
Independent variables. The independent variables are our proxies to measure the
level of transaction costs and capabilities. As abovementioned, municipalities with
high production costs usually deal with relatively low transaction costs in contract-
ing with other municipalities to buy water, because the costs of producing internally
are likely to be higher than the costs of buying water. Complexity in producing wa-
ter is mainly linked to the type of water and to the type of treatment needed to make
the water drinkable. For example, ground water is usually associated with higher
treatment complexity, i.e. needing more chemicals, because it is more polluted than
underground water. Under mixed sources of water, costs might be higher than for
ground or underfoot sources as the utility might need a treatment plant for each
type of water. From the IFEN-SOES dataset, we know whether raw water comes
from ground, underground or mixed sources. We used a dummy that equals 1 when
raw water comes from ground or mixed sources and 0 otherwise. Water treatment
does not only approximate the complexity of service provision but also the level
of specific investments needed to operate the service. Treatments are sixfold and
coded between 1 and 6 in the IFEN-SOeS dataset. Treatments 1 to 3 are pretty
standard, treatments 4 and 5 are used when raw water needs a heavy disinfection
treatment plus extra-controls. Treatment 6 refers to cases in which water needs
mixed treatments, for example treatments of types 1 and 4, which is standard when
water sources are mixed. A dummy that is equal to 1 when treatments 4, 5 or 6 are
used and 0 either captures the complexity of the public service.
We built several variables that account for the RBV. Selling Capabilities are
measured as the ratio between water exports and exports plus billed water for a
given municipality i in time t. As Concurrent Sourcing, this variable goes from 0
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to 100 and gives a good account of contracting capabilities. This measure is a good
proxy for contracting capabilities because it captures effectively the experience of
municipalities in writing and administrating water trading contracts. Moreover,
there are no other reasons, either than contracting capabilities, explaining why mu-
nicipalities selling water would buy water as well as they have apparently production
capabilities. Contracting capabilities can be measured with the propensity to con-
tract for other services than water trades. We used a dummies equal to 1 and 0
either if the city leases the water and sanitation public service. We expect these
variables to have a positive impact on concurrent sourcing.
Production Capabilities are measured as the ratio between water produced and
billed water for a city i in year t. Production capabilities capture the potential
scale economies from internal production. We also include a proxy for Cost Effi-
ciency that is the ratio between the marginal price of a given city i and the average
marginal price of municipalities in the same administrative region as a municipality
tends to buy water from other municipalities around. The intuition is that relative
prices can motivate exchange, especially concurrent sourcing when the local price
of water is high.
Controls. Several controls are included in the model. Population and incomes
are important controls, because they can impact the city’s resources. Including such
controls purges effects that can be linked to the size or the economic conditions of
the city. A dummy for touristic areas is taken into account because touristic mu-
nicipalities face larger levels of consumption and need to increase their production
capabilities during some periods of the year. We borrowed from INSEE a dummy
that takes 1 when the municipality is located in a touristic area and 0 otherwise.
We used variables computed by the French Ministry of Environment to distinguish
urban, semi-urban and rural areas. This is an important control because we would
expect rural areas to have more agricultural production that can increase the need
for concurrent sourcing. Pipes’ length are also an important control because it cor-
relates to the level of water trades. Indeed, similar municipalities can differ in the
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size of the network because one integrally produces internally while the other uses
concurrent sourcing and thus need larger connexions to the other municipalities
around. Year and local fixed-effects are considered in all models such as regional
and time fixed effects. This accounts for norms, rules and market structure that
can influence contract hazards associated with TCE. These controls are also impor-
tant because there can be some unobservable characteristics that can impact the
outsourcing decision such as competition or the political agenda.
Empirical Identification
We use two different models to compute the impact of TCE and RBV on concurrent
sourcing. As municipalities are not always interconnected, the decision to concur-
rently source might not be exogenous, i.e. municipalities must be interconnected
to trade water. To control for this potential selection effect, we apply a simple
Heckman [1979] selection model. In the first stage, we use a Probit model of the
probability for a municipality of being interconnected as a function of explaining
variables. The selection equation is:
Vi = β0+βZi+ηi (1)
where Vi is a latent variable equal to one if the city is interconnected with other
municipalities, β the vector of coefficients for the selection equation, Zi the vector
of covariates for city i and ηi the random disturbance for a given city i. The vector
of covariates includes dummies for the urban, semi-urban or rural status, a dummy
equal to 1 if the city is located in a touristic area, a dummy equal to 1 if water
consumption is limited in the city and regional fixed-effects. From this equation,
we compute the inverse Mills ratio that is added as a variable in the second-stage
equation in order to account for the potential selection effect.
The first model uses an OLS regressor and takes concurrent sourcing as the
dependent variable. In this case, we expect concurrent sourcing to be impacted
16
by proxies for TCE and RBV. High transaction costs and production capabilities
should have a negative impact on concurrent sourcing while contracting capabilities
should have a positive impact. The equation takes the following form:
ConcurrentSourcingit = β0+β1Xit+β2Yit+β3 ·Xit ·Yit+αθit+ it (2)
with Xit a set of variables capturing TCE characteristics, Yit a set of variables
capturing RBV characteristics and θit a set of controls in municipality i in year t.
We finally test the impact of the make-and-buy decision on various performance
indicators such as price, water quality and network performance, controlling for
regional and year fixed-effects and including all controls. The following OLS model
is tested:
Performanceit = γ0+γ1ConcurrentSourcingit+ τφit+ it (3)
with φit a set of controls and fixed effects. To avoid any selection effect, the
model is run on municipalities with interconnected networks. This model is useful
to assess the impact of concurrent sourcing on performance.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 includes four panels regarding whether there is a make and buy decision.
Panels (A), (B) and (C) respectively show the TCE, RBV variables and the other
controls. The table is divided between public services that only make and use con-
current sourcing. Descriptive statistics provide an initial indication of the direction
of the impact of transaction costs and capabilities on concurrent sourcing. In Panel
(A), complexity is higher for services that make and buy, meaning that transaction
costs to use the market as a governance mode are relatively lower for these munici-
palities. Panel (B) shows that municipalities with higher contracting capabilities are
also more often concurrently sourcing. Moreover, municipalities using concurrent
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sourcing have lower cost-efficiency and production capabilities than municipalities
only making. Descriptive statistics are thus consistent with our hypotheses.
Finally, Panel (C) shows that population, income, the probability of being in
a touristic or an urban area are on average higher in utilities that use concurrent
sourcing. These variables are important to understand the demographics of mu-
nicipalities which are important shifters of demand that can explain concurrent
sourcing.
Results
Concurrent Sourcing
Table 7 reports the results of equation (2) with concurrent sourcing as a dependent
variable. Models (1) to (4) are OLS regressions. Models (1) and (3) test hypotheses
1 to 4. Models (2) and (4) test hypotheses 5 and 6. In all models, concurrent
sourcing depends on TCE and RBV characteristics but models (2) and (4) include
crossed variables to measure the moderation effect of the degree of complexity on
contract and production capabilities. Models (1) and (2) use regional and year fixed
effects while models (3) and (4) use the interacted year and region fixed effects. All
models include the inverse Mills ratio to control for the potential selection effect
(results from Equation (1) are presented in appendix).
We first comment on the main impacts observed in models (1) to (4). Complex-
ity, measured as complex treatment, has a significant positive impact on concurrent
sourcing in all models, which supports hypothesis 1; complex water has a positive
but non-significant impact in models (1) and (2) but become positive and signif-
icant as expected when we change the nature of fixed effects. When complexity
to produce is high, transaction costs to use the market become relatively lower
than bureaucratic costs and the market will be selected as a sourcing mode rather
than internal production. In all models, contracting capabilities at the utility-level,
measured by selling capabilities, have a significant positive impact on concurrent
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sourcing. Experience in subcontracting to sell water fosters buying from other mu-
nicipalities as hypothesis 3 stands. The main impact of production capabilities is
significantly negative in both models and strongly supports hypothesis 4. We in-
clude another proxy for production capabilities that is the relative marginal price
of a unit of production. The lower the relative price is, the more competitive the
production capability of the city is and the less it will concurrently source water.
We thus expected a positive relationship between the relative price and the level of
concurrent sourcing, confirming hypothesis 2.
Table 2: Concurrent Sourcing as a Function of Transaction Costs and Capabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Variables Concurrent Sourcing
Complex Water (=1) 1.128 0.994 3.183*** 2.998***
(0.767) (0.742) (0.716) (0.695)
Complex Treatment (=1) 4.19*** 13.16*** 4.456*** 13.77***
(0.675) (5.039) (0.677) (5.105)
Selling Capabilities 0.198*** 0.162*** 0.240*** 0.186***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Production Capabilities -9.736*** -7.589*** -10.05*** -7.706***
(1.607) (1.506) (1.626) (1.508)
Selling Capabilities·Complex Treatment 0.120 0.165***
(0.083) (0.082)
Production Capabilities·Complex Treatment -7.516* -8.107***
(4.344) (4.479)
Relative Price 5.960*** 6.014*** 5.283*** 5.349***
(0.992) (0.974) (0.981) (0.958)
Private Management for Water (=1) 0.835 0.763 1.233** 1.085*
(0.604) (0.604) (0.589) (0.605)
Private Management for Sanitation (=1) 0.747 0.776 0.952* 0.979*
(0.554) (0.546) (0.549) (0.541)
Inverse Mills Ratio -16.84*** -18.31** -13.82*** -13.28***
(7.620) (7.356) (1.646) (1.773)
Constant 28.2*** 26.1*** 26.95*** 24.89***
(3.99) (3.852) (3.37) (3.17)
All Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Regional fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year·Regional fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 14,884 14,884 14,884 14,884
R-squared 0.247 0.262 0.217 0.235
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All other controls
include all other variables presented in Table 1 that are not reported in this table.
Models (2) and (4) account for the interaction of complexity with capabilities.
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Interaction terms show how transaction costs can mitigate or accelerate the impact
of capabilities on concurrent sourcing. Consistent with hypotheses 5 and 6, we ex-
pect complexity, i.e. the costs of hierarchy, to strengthen the impact of capabilities
on concurrent sourcing. In models (2) and (4), the interaction term between com-
plexity and contracting capabilities has a positive impact on concurrent sourcing,
thus showing that increased complexity renders transaction costs relatively lower
and stimulates the use of the market to source the good. The negative impact of
production capabilities on concurrent sourcing is reinforced by complexity as sup-
ports hypothesis 6. Lower transaction costs reinforce the impact of contracting
capabilities and decreases even more the impact of production capabilities.
In Table 7, in appendix, we provide the results of models (1) and (2) but we
add a dummy equal to 1 if the mayor is politically affiliated to a right-wing party
and 0 if the mayor is affiliated to a left-wing party. The information is available
for an unbalanced subset of 1,227 municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants.
Political affiliation might influence contracting decisions of municipalities. Conven-
tional wisdom would suggest that, ceteris paribus, right wing governments are more
pro-market than left-wing governments. Our results show that political persuasion
has no impact on concurrent sourcing and does not significantly alter the impact of
the independent variables of interest.
In summary, both theories assisted in explaining the level of concurrent sourcing.
TCE logic is supported as municipalities are more likely to buy if complexity for
directly sourcing is high. The capabilities view is supported as greater contracting
capabilities positively impact the level of concurrent sourcing, competitive capabili-
ties decrease the level of concurrent sourcing while production capabilities decrease
the level of concurrent sourcing. Overall, the results show that concurrent sourcing
is a governance mode per se that can be explained by the traditional theories of the
firm.
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Discussion and Limitations
Discussion
Our results are consistent with TCE and RBV theoretical predictions. Intuitively,
we would expect capabilities to be strengthened in environments with high levels of
transaction hazards. Our intuition is confirmed by the empirical analysis. Results
demonstrate systematic patterns in the heterogeneity of municipalities to organize
the sourcing of water. However, the results show also that capabilities impact dif-
ferently municipalities that have different levels of transaction costs and capabilities.
Municipalities with prior experience in designing and operating complex and
incomplete contracts may find such contracts less costly to write, be more skilled
at enforcing their requirements and be more accustomed to ex post adaptation.
This contracting experience has a substantial and significant effect on organiza-
tional choices. However, because transaction costs differ from a municipality to
another, contracting experience will have a declining effect when hold-up risks are
more important. The same effect is observed for production capabilities. Production
capabilities foster internal production and hierarchy rather than external sourcing
via the market. The effect is stronger when transaction costs decrease.
The contribution of the paper to theory is that transaction costs do not only
vary from a transaction to another but also from a production unit to another even
in similar institutional environment. This means that studying government con-
tracting should not be focused on the nature of the transaction but also on local
governments’ characteristics and their capabilities that can evolve across time.
The results also complement the RBV by specifying the transaction conditions
under which municipalities make more or buy more a good and how the mix varies.
Under high transaction costs, municipalities with high levels of production capa-
bilities will predictably make more and buy less than municipalities with similar
resources but operating on transactions with lower asset specificity. Perhaps, one of
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the most important insights to arise from a consideration of concurrent sourcing is
the value of systemic local government-level analysis coupled with transaction-level
analysis.
We finally assess the relative performance of municipalities using concurrent
sourcing rather than internal production. We simply test the impact of concurrent
sourcing on several performance indicators like price for a standard bill, marginal
price, water quality and network performance. Prices are measured in euros. Wa-
ter quality and network performance are expressed in percentage. Water quality is
measured as the percentage of succeeded sanitary tests in regards to certain stan-
dards while network performance is measured as the ratio of water losses to the
total volume distributed. Results are reported in Table 3. All four models are OLS
regressions including year and region fixed effects. Because of missing data, the
number of observations varies from a model to another. We observe that concur-
rent sourcing is associated with higher price level as depicted in models (1) and (2)
but stronger quality standards as illustrated models (3) and (4) show. This raises
a puzzle as the sourcing production unit would be expected to do so when its sup-
pliers’ production costs are lower. There can be various explanations to this trend.
The first one is that for a given complexity making internally is always cheaper.
This is especially true for water production as - contrary to other goods - there
is no competitive advantage from external procurement in terms of knowledge or
innovative competition. Moreover, the price charged to the sourcing municipality
may be higher than those in internal procurement, due to the risk borne by hav-
ing transaction costs in implementing contracts and uncertainty in the transferred
volume. In this case, securing supply flows is a sufficient reason to source both
internally and externally and the price premium is comparable to an insurance pre-
mium. To avoid disruptions in supply, municipalities would use concurrent sourcing
as a means to assure the continuity of water public services. The slight increase
in price would then be the price to pay to use alternative sourcing modes, rather
than relying on the single use of internal production. Hefetz et al. [2014] find that
concurrent sourcing is lower with inter-municipal contracts. They attribute this to
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more common goals between municipal partners and thus less risk and less need for
concurrent sourcing. Our dataset does not allow us to track the characteristics of
partners in the sourcing decisions.
We believe that this piece of research sheds light on the cost of this insurance
premium, already highlighted in Hefetz et al. [2014]. The final reason is that in
water markets, as in many commercial transactions, supply markets are relatively
thin due to some specific investment or capabilities required to manage contracts
and thus local governments have few potential external suppliers. This raises the
trade-off between specific investments required for concurrently source a good and
capabilities to negotiate with limited suppliers that we approximated with the model
of concurrent sourcing. Higher quality standards under concurrent sourcing can re-
sult from higher market complementarity, improved performance from personnel
that would fear competition from the other sourcing units or higher monitoring
resources from local governments use to concurrently source. More investigation,
using detailed contract-level data, could be undertaken to deepen these points.
Table 3: The Efficacy of Concurrent Sourcing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Variables Price Marginal Price Water Quality Network Performance
Concurrent Sourcing 0.119*** 0.001*** 0.005 0.017***
(0.022) (0.0001) (0.006) (0.005)
All Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,738 12,738 7,682 12,487
R-squared 0.256 0.259 0.127 0.212
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. For ease in reading, all other
controls include all variables used in previous regressions, except interactions. The number of observations falls as
we do not have always complete information on performance.
As our dataset provides no access to contracts to exchange water, we collected
annual reports on 139 bigger water utilities for 2009 that both make and buy water.
All the observations include at least one city with 15,000 inhabitants. We could
get information on the subcontracts with other municipalities for a subsample of 62
public services. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4. From this subsample,
we find no evidence that trades are organized between municipalities managed by
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the same operators. In most cases, the motivation reported to trade with other
municipalities comes from the need for service continuity and the existence of con-
tracts to trade water with municipalities around. These exchanges can be negotiated
through long-term contracts but usually the trade is organized using a short-term
contract of one year that is renewed every year with an adaptation of the volume
sold.
Table 4: Contracts to Trade Water
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Billed Units 5102.25 6671.26 681.358 40298
Imports 1302.13 2003.60 0.48 9835
Average Number of Partners 1.94 1.41 1 7
Contracting with the Same Operator 0.23 0.42 0 1
Concurrent sourcing and selling 0.26 0.44 0 1
Note: Billed Units and Imports in thousands cubic meter for 2009. The average number of partners is the
average number of contracts for municipalities using concurrent sourcing. The two last lines report the
share of municipalities contracting with at least one city managed by the same operator and the number
of municipalities which make, buy and sell water.
The transaction hazards and the framework studied in this paper are specific
to the residential water industry. Nevertheless, the theoretical implications can be
however expanded to other public services or to any contracting decisions.
Conclusion
This paper integrates TCE with the RBV to examine how transaction hazards and
capabilities influence local governments’ propensities to use concurrent sourcing in
water public services. Using a unique dataset on water public services of more
than 4,000 French municipalities for four years - 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2008 - we
find that low transaction hazards, prior contracting experience and low production
capabilities have a positive impact on the level of concurrent sourcing. These find-
ings suggest that organizations’ heterogeneity is a significant factor in governance
decisions and that capabilities and their interactions with transaction hazards de-
mand superior consideration in the study of contracting choices in public services.
This paper also shows that concurrent sourcing is associated with higher price and
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quality, which we respectively interpret as a risk premium - to ensure the service
continuity - and the result of a better monitoring of suppliers.
This paper has several implications for managers. When considering their sourc-
ing options, public managers should not only be aware of the level of transaction
hazards but also of their capabilities to manage contracts and to directly source
the public service. Capabilities in contracting can be very important to mitigate
hazards such as ex post renegotiation and this might be the reason why the results
show that municipalities with high capabilities in contracting tend to concurrently
source more than municipalities with low level of contracting capabilities. Local
governments with superior capabilities in contracting can thus adopt concurrent
sourcing to have a better monitoring of the sourcing process, benefiting from other
local governments production capabilities and increasing incentives for their own
services.
Some unobserved factors would deserve more attention, among them, the pos-
sibility that past governance choices provide learning and capabilities that are dy-
namic and can in turn influence future governance decisions, especially in local
governments operating in an environment with a lot of transactional hazards. Or-
ganizational capacity is an important factor explaining the success of concurrent
sourcing or mixed delivery (Hefetz and Warner [2008]). Further research should
focus on collecting data on contracts in public services with high degree of concur-
rent sourcing to analyze the impact on the market structure of the make-and-buy
decision.
References
Adelman, M. (1949). The Large Firm and Its Suppliers. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 31:113–118.
Azoulay, P. (2004). Capturing Knowledge Within and Across Firms Boundaries: Ev-
26
REFERENCES REFERENCES
idence from Clinical Development. The American Economic Review, 94(5):1591–
1612.
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage. Jour-
nal of Management, 17(1):99–120.
Bel, G. and Fageda, X. (2009). Factors Explaining Local Privatization: A Meta-
Regression Analysis. Public Choice, 139:105–119.
Brown, T. L. and Potoski, M. (2003a). Contract Management Capacity in Municipal
and County Governments. Public Administration Review, 63(2):136–147.
Brown, T. L. and Potoski, M. (2003b). Managing Contract Performance: A Trans-
action Costs Approach. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 22(2):275–
297.
Brown, T. L. and Potoski, M. (2003c). Transaction Costs and Institutional Expla-
nations for Government Service Production Decision. Journal of Public Admin-
istration Research and Theory, 13(4):441–468.
Brown, T. L. and Potoski, M. (2004). Managing the Public Service Market. Public
Administration Review, 64(6):656–668.
Brown, T. L. and Potoski, M. (2005). Transaction Costs and Contracting - The Prac-
titioner Perspective. Public Performance and Management Review, 28(3):326–
351.
Brown, T. L. and Potoski, M. (2006). Contracting for Managing: Assessing Man-
agement Capacity under Alternative Service Delivery Arrangements. Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 25(2):323–346.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4:386–405.
Demsetz, H. (1988). The Theory of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organization, (1):141–161.
27
REFERENCES REFERENCES
Dyer, J. H. and Singh, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and
Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage. Academy of Management
Review, 23(4):660–679.
Emerick, K. and Lueck, D. (2014). Economic Organization and the Structure of
Water Transactions. Working paper.
Fabrizio, K. R. (2012). Institutions, Capabilities, and Contracts: Make or Buy in
the Electric Utility Industry. Organization Science, 23(5):1264–1281.
Greene, J. D. (1996). How Much Privatization? a Research Note Examining the Use
of Privatization by Cities in 1982 and 1992. Policy Studies Journal, 24(4):632–
640.
Gulati, R., Puranam, P., and Bhattacharya, S. (2012). How Much to Make and
How Much to Buy: An Analysis of Optimal Plural Sourcing Strategies. Strategic
Management Journal.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica,
47(1):153–161.
Hefetz, A. and Warner, M. E. (2008). Managing markets for public service: The role
of mixed public-private delivery of city services. Public Administration Review,
68(1):155–166.
Hefetz, A. and Warner, M. E. (2012). Contracting or Public Delivery? the Im-
portance of Service, Market, and Management Characteristics. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 22(2):289–317.
Hefetz, A., Warner, M. E., and Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2014). Concurrent Sourcing in
the Public Sector: a Strategy to Manage Contracting Risk. International Public
Management Journal, 17(3):365–386.
Hefetz, A., Warner, M. E., and Vigoda-Gadot, E. (2015). Professional management
and local government service delivery: Strategic decisions across alternative mar-
kets. Public Performance and Management Review, 38(2):261–283.
28
REFERENCES REFERENCES
Jacobides, M. and Winter, S. G. (2005). The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and
Transaction Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production. Strate-
gic Management Journal, 26(2):395–414.
Kelman, S. (2002). Strategic contracting management. In Donahue, J. and Jr.,
J. N., editors, Market-Based Governance: Supply Side, Demand Side, Upside
and Downside, Handbook, chapter 1, pages 88–103. Washington DC: Brookings
Institute Press.
Kettl, D. (1993). Sharing Power: Public Governance and Private Markets. Brook-
ings Institution, Washington.
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., and Alchian, A. A. (1978). Vertical Integration, Ap-
propriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and
Economics, 21(2):297–326.
Levin, J. D. and Tadelis, S. (2010). Contracting for Government Services: Theory
and Evidence from US Cities. Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(3):507–541.
Marques, R. (2008). Comparing Private and Public Performance of Portuguese
Water Services. Water Policy, 10(1):925–42.
Mayer, K. and Salomon, R. (2006). Capabilities, Contractual Hazards, and Gover-
nance: Integrating Resource-Based and Transaction Cost Perspectives. Academy
of Management Journal, 49(5):942–959.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1990). The Economics of Modern Manufactur-
ing: Technology, Strategy and Organization. The American Economic Review,
80(3):511–528.
Miranda, R. and Lerner, A. (1995). Bureaucracy, Organizational Redundancy, and
the Privatization of Public Services. Public Administration Review, 55(2):193–
200.
Monteverde, K. and Teece, D. J. (1982). Supplying Switching Costs and Vertical
Integration in the Automobile. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1):206–213.
29
REFERENCES REFERENCES
Parmigiani, A. (2007). Why Do Firms Make and Buy? An Investigation of Con-
current Sourcing. Strategic Management Journal, 28:285–311.
Penrose, E. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Wiley, New York.
Porter, M. (1980). Competitive Strategy. Free Press, New York.
Romzek, B. and Johnston, J. (2002). Effective Contracts Implementation and Man-
agement: A Preliminary Model. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 12(3):423–453.
Savas, E. (2000). Privatization: the Key to Better Government. Chatham House,
Chatham, NJ.
Sclar, E. D. (2000). You Don’t Always Get What You Pay for: The Economics of
Privatization. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., and Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic Capabilitie and Strategic
Management. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7):509–533.
van Slyke, D. M. (2003). The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social
Services. Public Administration Review, 63(3):296–315.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A Resource-Based View of the Firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5(52):171–180.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust Impli-
cations: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization. Free Press, New
York.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Con-
tractual Relations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22(2):233–261.
Williamson, O. E. (1991). Comparative economic organization: The analysis of
discrete structural alternatives. Administrative science quarterly, 36(2):269–296.
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The Mechanics of Governance. Oxford University Press,
New York.
30
REFERENCES REFERENCES
Yang, K., Hsieh, J., and Li, T. (2009). Contracting Capacity and Perceived Con-
tracting Performance: Nonlinear Effects and the Role of Time. Public Adminis-
tration Review, 69(4):681–696.
31
REFERENCES REFERENCES
Appendix: Results from the selection equation
Table 5: The Determinants of Interconnections between Municipalities
(1)
Probit
Variables Interconnected (=1)
Limitation (=1) -0.015
(0.053)
Touristic Area (=1) -0.200***
(0.068)
Regional, Urban status and Year Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 19,454
Pseudo R-squared 0.15
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *p<0.10, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01.
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Table 6: Concurrent Sourcing as a Function of Transaction Costs and Capabilities, In-
cluding Controls in the Table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
Variables Concurrent Sourcing
Complex Water (=1) 1.128 0.994 3.183*** 2.998***
(0.767) (0.742) (0.716) (0.695)
Complex Treatment (=1) 4.19*** 13.16*** 4.456*** 13.77***
(0.675) (5.039) (0.677) (5.105)
Selling Capabilities 0.198*** 0.162*** 0.240*** 0.186***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Production Capabilities -9.736*** -7.589*** -10.05*** -7.706***
(1.607) (1.506) (1.626) (1.508)
Selling Capabilities·Complex Treatment 0.120 0.165***
(0.083) (0.082)
Production Capabilities·Complex Treatment -7.516* -8.107***
(4.344) (4.479)
Relative Price 5.960*** 6.014*** 5.283*** 5.349***
(0.992) (0.974) (0.981) (0.958)
Private Management for Water (=1) 0.835 0.763 1.233** 1.085*
(0.604) (0.604) (0.589) (0.605)
Private Management for Sanitation (=1) 0.747 0.776 0.952* 0.979*
(0.554) (0.546) (0.549) (0.541)
Pipe 1.347*** 1.307*** 1.811***
(0.583) (0.561) (0.522) (0.501)
Population -1.484*** -1.509*** -1.850*** -1.897***
(0.495) (0.486) (0.445) (0.438)
Touristic Area (=1) 3.114** 3.278*** 4.567*** 4.523***
(1.036) (1.006) (0.803) (0.867)
Limitation (=1) -0.0603 -0.229 0.934 0.686
(0.753) (0.728) (0.752) (0.725)
Relative Income 1.629*** 1.514*** 1.823*** 1.685***
(0.37) (0.37) (0.303) (0.314)
Group of cities -2.181*** -2.060*** -2.614*** -2.513***
(0.620) (0.606) (0.500) (0.503)
Semi-Urban -0.835 -0.818 -0.846 -0.681
(0.928) (0.898) (0.718) (0.712)
Urban -5.123*** -5.144*** -4.794*** -4.428***
(1.930) (1.860) (1.131) (1.127)
Inverse Mills Ratio -16.84*** -18.31** -13.82*** -13.28***
(7.620) (7.356) (1.646) (1.773)
Constant 28.2*** 26.1*** 26.95*** 24.89***
(3.99) (3.852) (3.37) (3.17)
All Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Regional fixed-effects Yes Yes No No
Year·Regional fixed-effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 14,884 14,884 14,884 14,884
R-squared 0.247 0.262 0.217 0.235
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All other controls
include all other variables presented in Table 1 that are not reported in this table.
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Table 7: Concurrent Sourcing as a Function of Transaction Costs, Capabilities and May-
ors’ Political Persuasion
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Variables Concurrent Sourcing
Right-Wing Mayor (=1) 0.140 0.198
(0.717) (0.680)
Complex Water (=1) -2.350** -2.430**
(1.001) (0.944)
Complex Treatment (=1) 3.954*** 20.17
(1.065) (13.00)
Selling Capabilities 0.365*** 0.283***
(0.102) (0.0650)
Production Capabilities -24.86*** -18.43***
(5.269) (3.765)
Selling Capabilities·Complex Treatment 0.150
(0.204)
Production Capabilities·Complex Treatment -13.09
(11.39)
Relative Price 1.928 1.995
(1.716) (1.680)
Private Management for Water (=1) -1.230 -1.129
(1.071) (1.028)
Private Management for Sanitation (=1) 1.320 1.405*
(0.875) (0.832)
Pipe 2.201** 2.017**
(0.870) (0.819)
Population -3.126*** -2.925***
(0.904) (0.876)
Touristic Area (=1) 2.442 2.645*
(1.510) (1.433)
Limitation (=1) 0.619 0.479
(1.195) (1.182)
Relative Income 0.0722 0.0410
(0.476) (0.481)
Group of Cities (=1) -3.269*** -2.940***
(1.106) (1.024)
Inverse Mills Ratio 7.143 5.017
(6.894) (6.518)
Constant 61.96*** 51.53***
(8.774) (8.347)
All Other Controls Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Regional fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 4,179 4,179
R-squared 0.399 0.421
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All other controls
include all other variables presented in Table 1 that are not reported in this table.
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